Methodology This report is based on extensive in-person interviews, including with senior CPP civilian and military officials, members of the military and police, civil servants, judges, prosecutors, foreign and Cambodian diplomats, foreign and Cambodian journalists and human rights workers, academics, and others, some of whom also provided open source and other materials from their files.
All 12 owe their senior positions in the security forces to personal links to Hun Sen dating back two decades or more, and their willingness to abuse human rights.
Tea Banh, an ethnic Thai, had left the Khmer Rouge ranks in and taken refuge in Thailand speed dating q101 Although each of the 12 has a legal responsibility to represent the speed dating q101 instead of a political party—and to carry out their duties in an impartial and neutral manner—all act in an openly and highly partisan manner.
During the next decade, according to official Vietnamese and Cambodian accounts, a total of someVietnamese troops and 10, Vietnamese officials were deployed into Cambodia to defend and help build PRK structures, including at the party Central Committee, national government ministry, provincial, and municipal levels and especially in the military, security, and foreign affairs fields.
The numbers in the report understate the extent of the violations because UNTAC could not investigate all cases or specify who was responsible in all of the cases it did investigate. In his time in power, hundreds of opposition figures, journalists, trade union leaders, and others have been killed in politically motivated attacks.
These 12 men are the backbone of an abusive and authoritarian political regime over which an increasingly dictatorial Hun Sen rules. However, Command Committee was dissolved.
Among them was Hun Sen, another one-time member of the Khmer Rouge military-security apparatus who, during his time as a Khmer Rouge commander, played an unclear role in areas where crimes against humanity were committed. Each of the 12 is part of a kind of Praetorian Guard for Hun Sen. The killings sent opposition politicians and activists into exile in fear for their lives.
This report begins with a detailed history of the three main components of the contemporary Cambodian security forces—the army, gendarmerie, and police—tracing the development of their chains of command. Members of the Central Committee are required to carry out all party policies.
In September the Cambodia Daily was forced to close, while in May the owners of the Phnom Penh Post were coerced by the government into selling the paper to a Malaysian company with ties to Hun Sen.
Nhek Bunchhay, while Pol Saroeun held a secondary deputy post. The different titles meant little, as each had the same legal powers.
Tea Banh praised the security forces for having prevented these activities by timely suppression of demonstrations and protests. Each has throughout his career served in government jobs paying relatively modest salaries, yet each has amassed large amounts of unexplained wealth.
Any incomplete sourcing in footnotes is to protect sources. Abuses committed during repression of rising popular dissatisfaction with the PRK and its reliance on Vietnamese backers include arbitrary political detention and routine torture in a provincial prison run under the authority of Pol Saroeun when he was governor there; in the municipal prison of the capital, Phnom Penh, when Neth Savoeun was a senior police officer there; and in the political security apparatus of the Ministry of Interior when Sok Phal was an important cadre there.
This practice has become more open and formal in recent years.
The coalition arrangement lasted until Julywhen Hun Sen ousted Prince Ranariddh in a coup. The speed of the collapse of even the patina of democracy and basic rights has been startling. Although in many cases those responsible for the killings are known, in not one case has there been a credible investigation and prosecution, let alone conviction.
In some cases, triggermen or fall guys have been prosecuted; higher-ups have been left untouched. The texts of the interviews are on file with Human Rights Watch.
Human rights organizations and other critics of the government have responded by self-censoring to avoid being targeted. Hun Sen and the CPP threatened secession of seven eastern provinces and renewed civil war if they were not made equal partners in a new government, including maintaining de facto control over the military and police.
The ministry was divided into three main units through the PRK period: Hun Sen has responded by suggesting that engaging in opposition politics or criticizing him, the CPP or the government is a form of treason. His successor, Kem Sokha, was arbitrarily arrested in September and remains in prison.
Weigh heavily the opinions of the foreign advisors … At all levels and in all sectors, we should discuss with the fraternal advisors in order to agree on weekly and monthly programs and planned activities.
The CNRP had unprecedented success in the national elections despite systematic and structural biases and significant fraud.
According to CPP-friendly media, they comprised the leadership ofsecurity forces. This report details the responsibility of 12 of these senior security force officers for human rights abuses in Cambodia from the late s until the present: The ministry was also not empowered to perform key staff functions like intelligence gathering and analysis.
The Impossibility of Democratic Reform with Politicized Security Forces Hun Sen and the CPP are increasingly reliant on the 12 commanders — and many other senior security personnel in the army, gendarmerie, and police — who are the subject of this report.The impetus for this crackdown appears to be that Hun Sen and the CPP fear that without such measures they cannot be sure of winning the next national elections scheduled for JulyDownload